

EXHIBIT NO. 96

JULY 16, 1940.

It is my thought that you might find interesting the papers here attached. If so, and if you should feel so disposed, perhaps you would care to send the memorandum on to the Chief of Naval Operations.

You will note that there are on these papers no identifying marks. I think that it would be well to give no indication of source. The material stands or falls on its own merits without reference to authorship or location of the authors.

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REFLECTIONS ON CERTAIN FEATURES OF THE FAR EASTERN SITUATION AND CERTAIN PROBLEMS OF U. S. FAR EASTERN POLICY. JULY 4, 1940.

I. General Observations.

The situation in the Pacific is one in which, on the one hand Japan and China are engaged in armed hostilities in the course of which Japanese armed forces have been and are doing violence to American lives and property and the Japanese Government by official acts is impairing American rights and interests, while on the other hand there is constant, though not now acute, tension in relations between Japan and the United States; it has been and is the policy of the United States to discourage and to oppose the course which Japan is following; it is generally agreed that diplomatic representations by the American Government, together with the termination of the treaty of 1911 upon this Government's initiative, and the moves which this Government has made in disposal of its naval forces, have exercised some restraining influence upon Japan; it is now notorious that a strong element in Japan's leadership advocates a move by the Japanese armed forces toward seizure of French Indo-China and/or the Dutch East Indies, and that the said element has strong support among the Japanese populace; it is the estimate of various observers that the presence of the U. S. Battle Fleet at Pearl Harbor weighs heavily in Japan's deliberations with regard to the question of the Dutch East Indies and other new moves of [2] aggression; the most effective opposition at the present moment to Japan's program of imperialistic expansion is the resistance which is being made by the Chinese; the Government and the people of the United States desire that the Chinese resistance be not overcome and the Japanese effort to gain control of China be not successful; and the policy and the acts of the United States during recent years have given encouragement and support to the Chinese policy of resistance, have strengthened Chinese morale, and have contributed to the facts that the Chinese have refused to negotiate a compromise settlement and the Japanese have not been able to gain an undisputed control of China or any part of China.

For seventy-five years the Germans, acting politically and as a nation, have given evidence that those elements which exercise decisive leadership of the German people believe in and rely upon force as the most effective and the conclusive instrumentality in international relations. For forty-five years the Japanese, acting politically and as a state, have given evidence that those elements which exercise decisive leadership of the Japanese people believe in and rely upon force as the most effective and the conclusive instrumentality in international relations.

[3] Modern Germany was brought into existence in 1870 through Bismarck's success in pursuing his policy of "Eisen und Blut". The present Japanese Empire has been developed since 1867 by a process of accumulation under threat of force and/or application of force; first, seizure of nearby islands; next, war upon China and acquisition of Formosa and the Pescadores; next, war upon Russia and occupation of South Manchuria; next, gradual occupation followed by sudden annexation of Korea; next, seizure of Shantung and the now Japanese Mandated Islands in the Pacific; next, the occupation of all of Manchuria and Jehol; and now the effort to conquer China.

During the last ten years Japanese leadership has given ample evidence, for all who are willing to divest themselves of preconceived theories and natural prejudices, of their high regard for force and low regard for moral principles.

legal precepts, and/or contractual obligations, in international relations. Since 1933 Nazi leadership has done the same—but with greater intensity.

In 1931 the Japanese resorted to the use of force against China. Neither the League of Nations nor any of its members were willing to take any forceful effective steps toward stopping the Japanese. Nor was the United States willing to take any such steps. The Japanese went ahead, and, [4] by use of force, attained not only their objective but more than what they had had in contemplation at that stage. In 1934 the Italians resorted to use of force and found that neither the League of Nations nor any of the world powers, including the United States, were willing to use force to stop them. The Italians achieved all that they had set out to achieve. In 1937 the Japanese decided to take the next step in a program to which their leadership has long been committed in principle, another step in a program which envisages many more steps extending far into the future. They attacked China. They occupied considerable portions of China. Neither the League of Nations nor any great power has seen fit forcefully to oppose them. The only resistance by force that has been made to Japan's program of use of force is that which has been and is being made by the Chinese.

In 1932 the British Government asked the Japanese Government for a pledge that the Japanese Government would respect the principle of the "open door" in Manchuria, and, having been given by the Japanese Government that pledge, the British Government declared itself satisfied. In 1935 certain British and French statesmen collaborated in secret and were prepared to make to Italy a proposal for a compromise in regard to Ethiopia. World opinion ruled that [5] proposal out. Had that proposal been made to Mussolini, there is little reason for anyone believing that it would have been accepted. Had it been made and been accepted, there is little warrant, in the light of subsequent events, for any supposition that Mussolini would later have been restrained by his acceptance of it. In 1938 Mr. Chamberlain made an agreement with Herr Hitler. Almost immediately Hitler completely disregarded his part of the agreement and went forward with steps in a program which is conceived in terms of force and is being carried out in terms of force.

The Government and the people of the United States are committed by a long tradition to the principle of opposing conquest. They are likewise committed to the principle of supporting international law. They are committed by a considerable number of treaties to the principle of respecting the sovereignty and the territorial and administrative integrity of China. They are committed both by treaty and by unilateral declarations (of several Administrations) to the principle of respecting the rights and interests of all concerned in and with regard to China. They are committed by declarations of the last preceding and the present Administration to the principle of refusing [6] to recognize (i. e. to give technical recognition to) certain types of change brought about by certain specified methods in the situation in the Far East.

The situation in the Far East, as between Japan and China, has for some months past been developing along the lines which tend to confirm the estimates upon which United States policy in this period has in large part been based. Chinese resistance has been maintained; the Japanese have been unable to bring matters to a conclusion at any point; processes of attrition have been affecting the Japanese more adversely than the Chinese; the Japanese people have developed doubts; Japanese resources have become constantly more slender; the possibility of a gradual dissolution of the Japanese effort to conquer China has constantly increased. If the United States and the British Government will but permit "Nature" to take its course, with a little help by giving some assistance to China and withholding some assistance from Japan, there is more than an even chance that the present Japanese effort to conquer China will be brought to an end, adversely to Japan, by processes of attrition and concomitants thereof.

[7] II. Retention of U. S. Fleet in the Pacific.

The Battle Fleet is at present in the Pacific. It is based in major part on Pearl Harbor. The U. S. Asiatic Fleet is in the Far Eastern Waters.

An order by the American Government for the U. S. Battle Fleet to leave the Pacific would be equivalent to a notification to the Japanese and the Chinese that the United States substantially abandons, for the time being at least, its effort to influence the course of events as between Japan and China. It would tremendously strengthen Japanese morale and (probably disastrously) weaken Chinese morale. It would give assurance to the Japanese Army in China that opportunity exists for it to go as far as it may be able with not only the Chinese

but also American and other foreign nationals, foreign properties, foreign rights and foreign interests in China. It would give assurance to the Japanese Navy that opportunity exists for it to go as far as it may be able with foreign territorial possessions in the Pacific. It would encourage the Japanese toward thinking seriously even of closing in upon Singapore and of stirring up trouble in India. It might resolve such doubts as many Japanese entertain of the advisability of a closer association with Germany. It would make Japan the one and only great power exercising effective influence in the area of the [8] Pacific and the Indian Oceans, in the whole area westward from the Panama Canal and eastward from Suez and the Cape of Good Hope. It would leave the United States exposed on the West Coast; it would leave Mexico and Central America exposed; it would leave the whole west coast of South America exposed. It would make it difficult if not impossible for any countries other than the United States to venture upon exerting of economic pressures against or in resistance to Japan; and it would increase such dangers to the United States as are or might be involved in the exerting by the United States of such pressures or resistance.

But, assume the order to have been given, assume the Fleet to have left the Pacific (with the flow of consequences which its departure would have), assume that the transit of the Canal to have been made successfully,—What disposal would be made in the Atlantic of this Fleet, and what necessary and useful purposes would that disposal be expected to serve? Would the expectation be that the Fleet be sent to European waters? Would the expectation be that, if sent there, it would be used for combat purposes? Would the expectation be that, the Fleet being kept in American waters, the mere presence of the Fleet in the Atlantic would in any way deter the Germans and Italians from the courses which they are pursuing in Europe or would in any way be of assistance to the British in their resistance? Would the [9] expectation be that the presence of the Fleet in the Atlantic would deter the Germans and Italians from launching attacks in the near future upon some part or parts of the Western Hemisphere? Would the expectation be that the Fleet would soon be needed for the purpose of defending this Hemisphere against such attacks definitely launched?

It would unquestionably be detrimental to the interests in the Pacific of the Allied Powers and their benevolent associate (the United States) for the United States to withdraw its Battle Fleet, at this early moment, from the Pacific. But mere transfer by the United States of its Battle Fleet to the Atlantic would in no way benefit the cause, at this moment, of the Allied Powers and the United States in connection with and in regard to the present phase of the armed conflict between the British and Germany. The German menace to the United States, while very real, is not yet direct, and it cannot short of several weeks or months become a physical reality. The United States Fleet has been and is needed in the Pacific; it is not yet needed in the Atlantic; and, if moved from the Pacific to the Atlantic at this moment, it could not in the Atlantic serve purposes equivalent to or more important than those which it has been and is serving in the Pacific.

[9a] Hitler still has some fighting to do in Europe. It is possible that within a short time England may, following the fate and the example of France, have to sue for peace. It is possible that the British Navy will be sunk. At the worst, Hitler may possibly gain complete control of Great Britain and acquire what remains of both the French and the British fleets. That, however, will not have happened by tomorrow morning and is not likely to have happened by the morning of a week from tomorrow.

The logical course for Hitler and Mussolini to follow is: Pursue to the end their armed conflict with Great Britain; make sure, either by diplomacy or by armed force, of the security of their rear, that is, make solid their relationships, for better or for worse, with the Soviet Union; consider and deal with whatever problems may remain as regards Sweden, Switzerland, the Balkans, Turkey and the Mediterranean; meanwhile, reorganize and improve their battered though victorious armed forces; consolidate administratively their position in and over the areas which they have conquered; recondition whatever implements and munitions of war they [9b] may capture; take care of various economic and social problems which are already acute and bound to be more so, such as the feeding and the clothing of the people of Germany and the peoples of the conquered territories; *make adequate preparations for an ultimate attack* upon points in the Western Hemisphere, which attack, if prematurely made, would be almost sure to be challenged by the United States and would absolutely ensure

embarkation by the United States upon an enormous program of armament; meanwhile, wage a diplomatic and propagandist campaign, based upon and centered in assurances that Germany and Italy are sated and are satisfied, have no further territorial objectives, are prepared to maintain peace in Europe and to be at peace with the rest of the world, and are in no way whatever a menace to the security or the prosperity or the general welfare of the Western Hemisphere and least of all to those of the United States.

Neither Hitler nor Mussolini nor both are going to [10] attack Latin America or the United States in the near future—certainly not within the next few weeks. If by any chance they should send over some sort of an expedition, their having done so would be “all to the good” so far as effect upon public opinion in this Hemisphere, and especially in the United States, is concerned. It would help to wake up a lot of people who are still only half awake and some more who are still sound asleep. From the point of view of general and particular political effects, we should welcome the making by Hitler or Mussolini of such a mistake. They will not make it.

Unless we are prepared to take the offensive, in support of Great Britain, in Europe, against Hitler, or unless we would expect to be so prepared before or by the time that our Fleet could arrive in the Atlantic, there does not exist today any good reason, in terms of use to be made of our Battle Fleet, for moving that Fleet today or tomorrow from Pearl Harbor.—Should an unforeseen and unforeseeable emergency develop, the Fleet could be moved from Pearl Harbor to Panama, at a practicable speed, in 13 days. And transit of the Canal requires two days.

If and when Hitler and Mussolini finish off England, and if and when the British fleet is sunk or is surrendered, the moment will then have arrived for reconsidering, urgently, the question of a better (than now) disposal of [11] our Fleet. Meanwhile, our Fleet stands on guard, as it has for some time past stood, in the Pacific—at Pearl Harbor, a highly strategic point. The presence of that Fleet there has exercised and is exercising a restraining influence upon Japan, discouraging new adventurings by Japan which would be adverse to American and British and French and some other countries' interests and encouraging continuance by the Chinese of their resistance to Japan. Whenever that Fleet leaves the Pacific, its departure will not only remove an obstacle to further adventuring by Japan but will actually encourage embarkation by Japan upon such adventuring; it will give Japan free rein in the Western Pacific, in the Southern Pacific and in the Indian Ocean; it will give Japan opportunity to place herself in full possession of vastly important natural resources and highways; it will enable the Japanese to complete their blockade of China; it will vastly strengthen Japanese and vastly weaken Chinese morale; it will probably mark the beginning of the end as regards China's resistance to Japan; it will enable the Japanese to send vast amounts of material to Germany and Italy; it will prepare the way for full cooperation by Japan with her Axis associates.

We may have to move our Fleet from the Pacific, and take those consequences—in due course. We do not have [12] to do it today. To do it now when there has not yet come real need for doing it would be to indicate that we are in a state of panic, not to say hysteria, that we are driven into that state by the mere thought of a possible risk of a possible attack upon some point in “our” Hemisphere; that we, not having gone to the aid of democracy in Europe, are ready to abandon the one country (China) which is “opposing force” in Asia; that, although we may be able at sometime in the future to fight, we are not able now to hold even a diplomatic position. If we were ready, now, to fight, and if we would, now, fight—to prevent the destruction of the British Fleet—we should at once move our Fleet, move it at full steam toward Europe. Not being either ready or willing, now, to do that, we should still leave our Fleet where it is until there comes a time when we can do more with it elsewhere than we are doing with it now where it now is.

If and when we do move the Fleet out of the Pacific, we should simultaneously do something substantial in the line of giving further assistance to the Chinese. We might well do some more of that momentarily and frequently. The Chinese Government has for several months past been urgently asking us for assistance. The President, in his Charlottesville address, said: “* * * we will extend to the opponents [13] of force the material resources of this nation . . .”. We can no longer give assistance to France. We should be all the more in position, so far as our resources are concerned, to give assistance to China. Only Great Britain is opposing force in Europe today. Only China is opposing force in eastern Asia today. In assisting Great Britain—in whatever way—we

work for our own security. In assisting China—in whatever way—we work toward the same end.

There is little that we can do about Europe now. But we can still, if we but will, do a good deal about the Far East. Unless we are prepared to fight Hitler in Europe, now, we practically abandon our position in Europe, now, because of our not being prepared to act toward safeguarding it. Our abandonment of Europe is automatic. Question then comes: Not, shall we abandon our position in Asia in order to defend our position in Europe, but, our position in Europe already having been abandoned automatically, shall our position in Asia be abandoned by our own deliberate action—for the sake of safeguarding and strengthening our position in the Western Hemisphere.

Defense of and strengthening of our position in the Western Hemisphere does not require abandonment of our position in Asia, and the objective of defending and strengthening [14] of our position in the Western Hemisphere would not be best served by such an abandonment.

The unanswered question which this country must consider today is not the question what will Hitler do in regard to the Western Hemisphere after he has made himself supreme in Europe. It is what will *Germany and Japan* do, if and after Germany has become supreme in Europe and Japan has become supreme in the western Pacific and eastern Asia.

It is an axiom of military strategy that "the best defense is offense".

The soundness of this axiom is being demonstrated on an unprecedented scale in what has gone on in Europe recently and what is going on in Europe today; in their *war plans*, the Germans have built for offense; the British and— even more—the French built for defense; the Germans have taken the offensive and the British and the French fought a losing defensive battle—on French soil and with terrific defensive losses.

The vital problem which the people and the Government of the United States should be considering today is that of ways and means whereby Germany and Italy and Japan can be [14a] *stopped* rather than that of ways and means whereby the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere may become prepared to defend this Hemisphere in a world in which, Germany and Italy and Japan not having been stopped, those three powers and their satellites will begin (in due course) directly to make assaults upon the economy, the political setup, et cetera, et cetera, of this Hemisphere—with each of those three countries feeling that it cannot be secure as long as the United States remains a great power and feeling that the common objective of the three should be to render impotent or to destroy the United States.

We should keep in mind the fact that for practical purposes the world's great powers are today divided into two camps: on the one side are three aggressor nations—in combination: Japan, Germany, and Italy; on the other side are China, Great Britain—and the United States. (Russia is in a sense a not disinterested and not unbiased bystander, temporarily associated with but not very actively assisting the three active aggressors, and capable of becoming a liability or even a belligerent enemy to them.) The United States has not become a belligerent, but it also is not an impartial neutral; its interests lie on the side of Great Britain—and China; it will more and more give assistance to Great Britain—and should do the same for China; it is opposed to the three aggressors; it will be regarded more [14b] and more by each and all those aggressors as definitely and distinctly an enemy state; if the aggressors win, the United States—whether actively a belligerent or not—will thereafter be considered by the winners as having been for practical purposes an ally of the defeated powers and as a power remaining to be dealt with and disposed of (adversely) as such.

The United States has not been able by diplomacy nor by measures—including gestures—short of war to restrain Germany or Italy; but it has thus far exercised some restraining influence upon Japan and it is *capable of continuing to exercise such influence.*

The United States is not today in position to take the offensive (with use of force)—in the Atlantic. The United States is today in position to discourage, and to render difficult if not impossible, a move by *one* of the aggressors which, if attempted and if unchallenged, would place that aggressor (which is closely associated with its fellow aggressors) in undisputed control of a huge area in which there are very substantial British and French and Netherland and American political and economic interests and very substantial resources—in the Pacific.

If the United States wishes to contribute with maximum effectiveness, within the limitations under which we now work, toward *stopping* Germany and her aggressor associates, [14c] and thereby toward assisting the British and improving our own position as regards long swing security, the one area in which we *might* operate at present by disposal or use of force is the Pacific.

A course based on the principle of merely conserving and adding to our stock of weapons—while and notwithstanding the fact that the Nazis and the Italians win in Europe and the Japanese take possession of the western Pacific and the Indian Oceans—in order that we may now guard and later defend the Western Hemisphere, will not make the world safe for the United States. It will merely mean, if the British are defeated, that we, not having gone to their aid in the Atlantic or the Mediterranean, and not having safeguarded their position and ours in the Pacific, we, having let the rest of the world go under to Germany and Italy and Japan, will in the not distant thereafter have to take up arms by ourselves (with possibly *some* aid from *some* Latin American states) *on the defensive*, against assaults by one or two or three—but all working together—of the successful aggressor nations, those nations having then at their disposal unlimited resources, vast matériel, and a combined population of their own of 200,000,000 men and reservoirs of supplementary man power in the countries which they would have subjugated.

The best defense is offense. The next best defense is preparedness to use such weapons as one may possess toward preventing one's enemies from being strengthened and prevent- [14d] ing one's friends from being weakened. The poorest strategy of defense is that of simply building fortifications while permitting one's position to be completely encircled by a hostile combination the various units in which are daily becoming stronger and the combined forces of which will ultimately be overwhelming as regards resources and man power.

The United States could today either throw its forces in on the side of the British toward defeating the enemy combination in Europe *or* stand guard in the Pacific and prevent Japan from gaining control of the western Pacific, eastern Asia, and the Indian Ocean. If it does neither of these things, and if Germany, Italy and Japan win, the victorious aggressors will have before them and will give their attention to three tasks: they will have Russia to dispose of; they will have Latin America to dispose of; and they will have the United States to dispose of. If they attack Russia first, the United States will do nothing about that. If they begin assaults upon Latin America first, the United States will not be soon enough and full enough prepared to ensure against aggressor successes there. If they attack the United States first, we will be poorly equipped to stop them without initial and substantial losses to ourselves—and we would have practically no help from Latin America; we would be *fighting alone* against a combination which can attack both from the east and from the west; and we have only a one-ocean Navy.

[14e] This country could today make a substantial contribution toward making the world safe for the United States—and for other democracies. The United States can do little today toward preventing Hitler from becoming supreme in Europe. The United States could do much today toward preventing Japan from becoming supreme in eastern Asia. The United States can (may), of course, fall back upon and fortify its position within the Western Hemisphere. If it chooses to do this, and only this, the probability will be that, before long, weakened economically and cut off from valuable markets, especially those from which various essential raw materials are derived (in the Far East), the United States and its American associates will be confronted by material pressures, including those of armed force, not from the east alone but from the east and from the west—not by Germany alone but by Germany and Japan.

Not being ready and willing now to fight toward stopping [145] Hitler in Europe, we surely should refrain from giving him the aid and comfort of making to him a free gift of assured access, through Japan, to the natural resources of the Far East.

III. "Making Friends" with Japan.

On May 30 the *Chicago Daily Tribune* published an editorial entitled "How to Double the Fleet in a Week" in which the idea was advanced that the United States and Japan can and should "come to a friendly understanding". In this editorial the *Tribune* said: "The best defense policy of the United States could be written within a few weeks in a renewed trade treaty with Japan. . . . In effect the strength of the fleet would be doubled by cutting half its problem away."

On June 3 the *New York Daily News* published an editorial under the same title as that of the *Chicago Tribune's* editorial of May 30. In this editorial the *News* stated that, while it by no means always agrees with the *Chicago Tribune*, the latter's editorial under reference "interests us greatly". It expressed the opinion that "by making friends with Japan" the United States can avert finding itself "menaced with urgent trouble in the Atlantic and Pacific at the same time" and "would in effect double the strength of our (its) fleet".

[16] On June 6, Mr. Lippmann in an article of that date advanced the view that the United States and Japan should "enter immediately into friendly and conciliatory and candid negotiations . . . for the avowed purpose of preserving peace in the Pacific."

On July 1, Rear Admiral Yates Stirling (Retired) expressed in an article of that date the view that the interests of the United States "lie in reaching a friendly understanding with Japan, if one can be attained." Admiral Stirling said that "history would indicate that they (the Japanese) can be stopped only by superior military force". He advocated the beginning by the United States of "negotiations for a new basic treaty with Japan" and an attempt by the United States "generally to normalize Japanese-American relations". He concluded the article with the statement that "it would seem but the part of wisdom to assure the safety of our Pacific flank if we can do so with honor."

The fallacy in the line of reasoning which leads to the conclusions thus advanced in terms of suggestion or proposal by such analysts of international relations as propose that the United States should pursue a policy of appeasement toward Japan lies in the assumed—but not stated—major premise. What such analysts assume is that a country which is bent upon and is engaged in a major [17] program of predatory acquisitive activity (Japan) and a country which is opposed to and is menaced by that kind of activity (the United States) can merely by the conclusion by their governments of an agreement become "friends"; and, further, that if the United States and Japan would thus "become friends" the United States could expect Japan to respect and to safeguard American interests (and principles) in the Far East and the Pacific.—The authors of this suggestion—and assumption—apparently believe that two strokes of a pen on one piece of paper by two diplomats will transform a predatory nation overnight into a contented, peace-loving and peace-supporting power; also, that a treaty can take the place of and do the work of a Battle Fleet.—In the case of Mr. Lippmann, we find a writer who on June 4 had expressed regarding "the conquerors" (Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy) the view that ". . . we cannot buy their good will by trying to appease them" expressing two days later with regard to Japan the view that we can not only gain Japan's good will but can make of Japan a friendly and to-be-relied-upon associate by a process of appeasement. Query: Do any of these protagonists *really believe* that Japan's objectives and methods are today so unlike those of Germany that the United States and Japan could be "good friends" whereas and while the United States and Germany [18] cannot possibly be friends; that the United States must in the interests of its own security oppose Germany but at the same time not only should not oppose but should aid and support Japan?

Mr. Lippmann affirms that "Japan and the United States have nothing to gain and a very great deal to lose by going to war—or even by standing opposed as if they might be going to war" and that "it follows that there is no conflict between Japan and the United States which is not reconcilable by diplomacy", whence—that the United States has nothing to gain by opposing Japan. By the same tokens, there were not long ago those who, notwithstanding all of the evidence which was available to the whole world regarding the objectives and the methods of the Nazi leaders of Germany, contended that Great Britain and France had nothing to gain by standing opposed to Germany. By the same tokens, all conflict between Nazi Germany and Great Britain could be reconciled by diplomacy. (An effort based on that principle was made at Munich.) By the same tokens, all conflict between any "have" nation or nations and any "have not" nation or nations could be reconciled by diplomacy. By the same tokens, all conflict between capital and labor, and all conflict between political parties, and all conflict between the law-abiding members and the predatory members [19] of any community could be settled by diplomacy; the conflict between Japan and China could be settled by diplomacy; Japan's desire to possess the Netherlands East Indies could be disposed of by diplomacy; and "fifth column" activities anywhere and everywhere could be disposed of by diplomacy.

The essence of Mr. Lippman's proposal is that the United States should enter upon a "negotiation which might lead *through a new commercial treaty* to a political understanding", which would leave the American and the Japanese navies "free to maintain order and stability in their respective spheres of influence".

From 1911 to January 26, 1940 the United States and Japan *had* a commercial treaty and they had a number of other treaties—including the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact—which collectively were intended to regulate contacts, to ensure fair and equal treatment, and to maintain peace. Notwithstanding the existence of these treaties, Japan embarked upon a procedure of conquest and did all sorts of violence to American nationals, American property, and American rights and interests in general. The American Government protested and pled. Japan went right on. Finally the American Government denounced the commercial treaty in order that it might have its hands free to take, [20] if and when it saw fit, retaliatory action by measures short of war. For the first time, the Japanese became alarmed and began to show *some* respect for American rights in the Far East. Treaties had proved ineffective. Entreaties had proved ineffectual. Fear of possible material pressures finally had, and has been having, *some* influence. What the Japanese leadership today wants now above all things is to be relieved of all possibility of pressure from the United States—in order that Japan may "go the limit" toward completing her conquest of China and taking possession of various great storehouses of natural resources in eastern Asia and the western Pacific. The conclusion of a new commercial treaty *at this time* would be of tremendous advantage to Japan and would give the United States nothing comparable in diplomatic or economic value.

A division of the Pacific into a United States "sphere of influence" on the east and a Japanese "sphere of influence" on the west would, it is true, leave the Japanese Navy "*free*" in the thus-created Japanese "sphere", but it would not in any way ensure that the said navy would "maintain order and stability" in the said "sphere" or that Japan would respect in that area American, or British, or French, or Netherland, or Soviet, or Chinese rights and interests.

In passing, attention may be called to the fact that [21] the Japanese Navy was "free to maintain order and stability" in the Far East in 1931; the Japanese Navy has been "free" to do that thing ever since; it is "free" to do it today; and it has *not* done that; it has done just the opposite.

The Japanese have today no higher regard for a diplomatic arrangement, an international commitment, or a treaty provision than have the Germans. Some of the Japanese leaders may talk of or may make commitments, their Foreign Office may negotiate treaties, but the objective of their real leaders, the Army and the Navy within the "military element", is expansion of Japanese political authority and economic power—and Japanese armed force will move on and will take where it can, when it can, and as it can, being checked only by opposition to it of material obstacles which are or which it fears to be too great for it to overcome.

It is *not* "the truth" that "there is no conflict between Japan and the United States which is not reconcilable by diplomacy". The United States stands for peace on a basis of law, of order, of security, of justice, et cetera. Japan is bent today upon driving occidental interests out of eastern Asia and the western Pacific, and is bent upon establishing in eastern Asia and the western Pacific by whatever processes may contribute thereto a Japanese hegemony or a great and constantly greater Japanese political empire.

[22] There is no need or occasion for the European war to come to the Pacific—unless Japan chooses to bring (put) it there and the United States permits Japan to do so. There is no need or occasion for war to come between the United States and Japan—unless *Japan* goes further than she has already gone (which is too far) in moves of aggression and of general disregard and destruction of the rights and interests of the United States (and of the world at large). While the United States is in position to use economic pressures against Japan and to use a Fleet against Japan, there exist material obstacles which tend to restrain Japan's leaders. If the United States were to conclude with Japan, now, a new treaty ensuring Japan against economic pressures, and/or if the United States removes its Battle Fleet from the Pacific, one or both of those obstacles will thereby have been removed, and the temptation to Japan's effective leadership ("the military") to make the most of the opportunity thus presented will have been increased. Mere concluding of agreements at this moment will not suffice to convince the Japanese leadership that "friendly

relations" [23] with the United States henceforth are preferable to the gathering in of spoils rendered, by the concluding of agreements, the more readily available now and immediately available.

We should, of course and by all means, try to prevent consummation of a closer association by Japan of herself with the axis powers. But, we should do more than that, we should try to prevent advance by Japan toward further acts of aggression and acquisition by herself on her own account and for her own advantage—all of which acts, when and as engaged in, will contribute toward the working out of the plans of Nazi Germany. We have already done much toward restraining Japan. Simultaneously, ourselves exercising a great measure of self-restraint, we have been endeavoring to lead the Japanese to see that a course of aggression will in the long run be not profitable where as a course of procedure by peaceful means could be highly profitable. We have talked consistently and constantly of the importance of principles. Should we now make a wholesale abandonment of the said principles—thereby conceding that, not force, but mere *fear of force* is mightier than principles and mightier than professed devotion to principles?

Reduced to simplest terms, what the advocates of an appeasement propose is that we abandon our Far Eastern policy [24] of a hundred years' standing, that we abandon the idea of the integrity of sovereignties in the Far East, that we abandon such responsibilities as were and are ours under those which remain in effect of the Washington Conference treaties, that we give up the idea of befriending China toward resistance to Japan and thus toward defense of various of our principles and interests, and that we accord Japan, deliberately and by process of agreement, what would amount to a free hand in the western Pacific and eastern Asia. Now, if we wish to make these various abandonments, and if we wish to give Japan a free hand, we can do both very easily and without going to the trouble of or incurring the disadvantages which would accrue from doing so by concluding an agreement; all that we would need to do would be to announce on our own part that we abandon the field, to withdraw by our own orders the few ships that we have in Far Eastern waters and the few marines that we maintain at three points in China, and to move our Fleet from the Pacific into the Atlantic.

Assume, for the sake of thorough exploration, that it were granted in principle that we should negotiate some kind of an agreement with Japan. What might the provisions of that agreement be? What should they be? By answers to these two questions the appeasement thesis might be and [25] should be tested. These two questions should stand at the beginning of Mr. Lippmann's statement of that thesis. They should be answered before he proceeds with the contention that the problem of Japanese-American relations can be solved by diplomacy alone and that the action for which he contends would produce the solution.

The whole of the appeasement contention rests—for whatever else it may be worth—upon an assumption that, promises having been given by the United States and promises having been given by Japan, the United States could thereafter assume and expect that Japan would live up to or perform within the limits of her promises. In the light of the history of the past forty-five years, no such assumption could with warrant be made, and reliance upon any such assumption would be folly.

Japan has it within her power to ensure the peace of the Pacific. The United States does not have that within its power. Japan needs only to desist from certain courses in which she is engaged and to refrain from certain courses toward which she is inclined—and there will be peace in the Pacific. This means that the problem is a problem not of giving pledges, it is a problem of action, a problem [26] of behavior, a problem of performance. Action gives evidence and proof of intention. Assurances of intention constitute neither evidence nor proof.

The conflict which is raging today is between two great groups of major powers, is between two ideologies, is between those nations which have and which wish to hold and those nations which are out to "take"—and this conflict is world-wide. On one side are China, Great Britain, and the United States; on the other side are Japan, Germany and Italy. The conflict is raging not alone in Europe but also in the Far East. The three powers of the to-have-and-to-hold group are menaced not alone in Europe and on the Atlantic but in eastern Asia and on the Pacific. Whatever *any* one of the to-have-and-to-hold group loses is a loss for *all* members of the group; and whatever any one of the "take" group gains is a gain for all members of that group.

The United States, as a party to this conflict, *must function* not on one front only but on *two fronts*. In the event of our "abandoning" any angle of our western front (that is, the western Pacific and the Far East)—and of Japan's gaining thereby, and of China, Great Britain, et cetera, losing thereby—by just so much will the position [27] of the "have" group of which the United States is a member be weakened and the "take" group (Japan, Germany and Italy) be strengthened.

"We cannot buy . . . (the) good will" of the Nazis or the good will of the Fascists. Nor can we buy the good will of the Japanese military leadership. "We can (could), however, earn their (the Nazis' and the Fascists') contempt" and we can (could), by like efforts of attempt to "appease" them, "earn the contempt" of Japan's military leadership. And more, we could also earn the contempt of the British, the contempt of various of our own "neutral" associates, the contempt and resentment and bitterness of 400 million plus Chinese, the contempt of the whole world of today and of tomorrow.

[28] IV. Encouraging China to Make a Compromise or Adverse Settlement with Japan.

The Chinese do not wish today to make peace with Japan on the basis of any compromise which would leave Japanese armed forces in China. The Chinese are war weary, but no more so than are the Japanese. The Chinese are not confronted with any imminent necessity of making an early peace with Japan. Given a free field, the Chinese have at least even chances of outlasting the Japanese in a struggle which is highly burdensome to each of the two countries. It has been demonstrated during the past three years that the Japanese belief and representation that Japan is capable of creating in China conditions of peace, law, order, and stability are not well founded: the Japanese have shown themselves psychologically unqualified for the performance of that task. A "peace" settlement concluded between China and Japan now and under existing circumstances would have no solid foundations or anchorage. It would be inconsistent with American relationships and with U. S. objectives in relationships with the Far East, and it would not on balance profit the United States.

[29] Excerpt from letter by a Chinese business man to Mr. Walter Lippmann, dated June 6, 1940

"Carried to its logical conclusion, your thesis undoubtedly means that China should surrender and, like Denmark, Holland, Belgium and Norway cooperate with the aggressor. It would also signify that China's three years of desperate resistance in the name of democracy, with its unprecedented sacrifice of human lives and property, should be halted because of a European conflict which may affect America. In case any Chinese leader follows your logic and leads his people into the arms of Japan, what assurance would America have that the Japanese war machine, with the cooperation of 450,000,000 Chinese who have proved themselves sterling fighters, would not wage war on all Pacific countries? Does such an eventuality relieve America?

* * * * *

"As I view the desperate world situation, there is no easy short-cut to a peaceful settlement. Short-cuts no matter how sincere and well-intended, as amply demonstrated by the Munich agreements, only prolong the agony. The United States cannot fight aggression in one ocean and condone it in the other. To do so, simply destroys America's traditional foreign policy to no practical purpose.

"The Chinese during the past few years have successfully [30] resisted the aggressions of a mechanized army considered second only to Hitler's in striking power. They have done this with little else but their human flesh, indomitable spirit and courage. Thus far, they have demonstrated that vitality and spirit can count for just as much as mechanized material in modern warfare. They have kept the Japanese so occupied and exhausted that Japan today dares not move as rapidly as she would like in the direction of the Allied and American possessions in the Pacific. Japan, I assure you, cannot be placated by momentary measures of appeasement, and she fears nothing more than the Chinese will to continue their undying resistance. America's greatest assurance in the Pacific is the maintenance of this Chinese will to resist."

[31] Excerpts from *Chicago Daily News* editorial, June 10, 1940.

"A DEAL WITH JAPAN?"

"In order to make a deal with Japan today, we would have to condone, openly or covertly, its treaty-breaking invasions of China. We would have to betray not only our Chinese friends, but also more than a hundred years of American

policy in the Far East. We would be imitating, in effect, the worst and most dangerous aspects of Britain's 'appeasement' efforts.

"And once we had made the deal, of what use would it be? Japan has deliberately broken one solemn treaty with us. Why should it keep another, any longer than its own interest required? What guarantee would we have that, at the first opportunity, Japan would not gang up against us with the rest of our enemies?"

"No, there is only one way for us to be secure. We must make ourselves able, by combined sea and air power, supported by a sufficient army, to wage war, if need be, both in the Atlantic and the Pacific. No diplomacy, no scheming, no wishful thinking, no device, nothing whatever can save us now from this painful necessity, short of a miracle—the miracle of an Allied victory over Hitler."

[32] Excerpts from article by Raymond Clapper, published June 13, 1940.

NO DEAL WITH JAPAN

"Because we are afraid, we should try to appease Japan. How? By selling out now. By turning adrift to the tender mercies of the yellow race Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies and all way stations.

"In order to buy Japan's friendship and support, we would put the seal of our approval upon such a betrayal. We would scuttle on every international ideal. For our treachery we would gain nothing but a Munich, to last until the day when Japan wanted something else that had not been included in the bargain. Then Japan would take whatever it was that she wanted and pay no more heed to her deal with us than she paid to her treaty pledges when she went into Manchukuo, into China proper, or when she fortified the mandate islands in the Pacific.

"If Japan is determined to extend her domination in the Far East, at least let it not be done with our approval, as part of a deal with us. Let us not be a party to it in a craven act that would instantly be a tip-off to the totalitarian powers that we had lost our nerve as completely as the British lost theirs in the early 1930s, when [33] Japan went into Manchukuo, or as the French lost theirs when they permitted Hitler to reoccupy the Rhineland.

"Don't think that a deal with Japan would not be recognized as a tip-off to all Latin America, a tip-off that the third great democracy also was on the run. Are we to invite every Latin American country to begin saying of us, as the little nations of Europe did of Britain, that they cannot depend upon us? Are we to give them that encouragement to rush into deals with Hitler as the new rising force that is to replace the United States as the protector of the Western Hemisphere?"

* * * * *

"When France and England have been crushed, only the United States and our system on the Western Hemisphere, plus what we may take over from the British Empire, will be left standing in the way.

"In this situation we can trust nobody but ourselves. We can trust only our own force. We want none of the false sense of security that a deal with Japan would give us, a deal that might prove as treacherous as Munich. Japan is playing the same game as the other crowd and we should be foolish to deceive ourselves. We must make busy being the strong neighbor in the Western Hemisphere. No neighbor now is a good neighbor unless he is strong. We need guns, not treaties."

[34] Full text of *Chicago Daily News* editorial, June 17, 1940.

"THE APPEASERS

"The agitation for appeasement of Japan's ambitions in Asia by American concessions is growing among those who seem determined to force the United States into the fatal course taken by Britain under Neville Chamberlain.

"The proponents of this idea seem to think that Japan would be reasonable in its demands, and that, having signed an agreement with the United States, Japan would abide by it. Chamberlain had the same delusions about Germany and Italy. We have had agreements and treaties with Japan before. But they have been honored in the breach rather than in the observance.

"The philosophy behind this agitation is exemplified by a thoughtful editorial that appeared in the *Chicago Tribune* of May 30. Excerpts from it are cited here-

with. Accompanying them in italics are excerpts from the speeches of Neville Chamberlain:

"The United States and Japan can come to a friendly understanding. There is no obstacle in the way except the determination of some Americans to dominate Japan's policy in China.

"And yet whatever differences there may be between [35] us and other nations on that subject, do not forget that we are all members of the human race. . . . There must be something in common between us.

"Japan needs peace with the United States.

"There is not a country or government that wants to see a European war.

"Japan would be disposed to be more reasonable if Chinese ports and forts were not in European hands.

"If we can bring these four nations into friendly discussion, into a settlement of their differences, we shall have saved the peace of Europe for a generation.

"The Japanese are more willing now than ever to come to settlement in China. * * *

*"Before saying farewell to Herr Hitler * * * he repeated to me with great earnestness what he had already said at Berchtesgaden, namely, that this was the last of his territorial ambitions in Europe and that he had no wish to include in the Reich people of other races than Germans * * * that he wanted to be friends with England.*

"America may be able to aid China a great deal more effectively if it isn't quarreling with Japan than it can by keeping up a futile bombardment of threats and hard words. * * *

*"What we did wish to save her (Czechoslovakia) from annihilation and give her a chance of new life as a new state. * * * Therefore I think the government deserves the approval of this House for their conduct of affairs in this crisis which has saved Czechoslovakia from destruction and Europe from Armageddon."*

"The italicized paragraphs exemplify the Chamberlain philosophy of appeasement and delusion. The alternate paragraphs exemplify the philosophy of those who would follow the Chamberlain program here. We know how fallacious the Chamberlain philosophy was in the case of Britain. We should know how fallacious it would be if applied to our own affairs."

[37] Excerpts from letter by Carl Crow, dated June 14, 1940, published in Lynchburg, Virginia, *News*, June 17, 1940.

"No sensible person can disagree with the argument of Mr. Walter Lippmann that peace between the United States and Japan is highly desirable. But in his contention that we should hasten to conclude an amicable arrangement because of the dangers which threaten us Mr. Lippmann ignores consideration of facts which must be better known to him than to most Americans.

"The most important of these is that, as has so often been emphasized by Japan, the only basis of friendship she will recognize is based on approval of her policy in East Asia, involving the conquest of China. Unless we are prepared to do that anything else we might do would be as futile as Mr. Chamberlain's appeasement policy at Munich. Any move we might make toward the conclusion of a new trade treaty would be interpreted by the war lords who rule Japan as an evidence of weakness and instead of making relations better would only make them worse. It would only encourage them to further aggressions and would be a disservice to the Japanese people whose progress is halted by their own war lords.

* * * * *
 [38] "Mr. Lippmann appears momentarily to have forgotten that Hitler's attack on Europe, Japan's invasion of China and Mussolini's sword rattling were all preceded by the so-called "anti-Comintern pact" whereby the three became partners in a program which was not officially disclosed but has been made clear by actions. It was as a result of that pact and supplemental agreements that Mussolini is helping Hitler. The only reason Japan is not playing the same part is that she is bogged down in China and the American fleet is in the Pacific. Give Japan a free hand and she would at once abandon her policy of non-involvement—a policy that has been forced on her by her inability to carry out any other. With the open or secret aid of Japan to Hitler the chances of

an Allied victory would be greatly lessened. Indeed we might face much graver dangers than those which inspire Mr. Lippmann's fears—a victorious Germany on the Atlantic, a victorious Italy in the Mediterranean and a victorious Japan on the Pacific, all bound together by a secret agreement and each inspired by the same conviction that democratic government should be crushed.

"Faced by a menace of that seriousness, what further measures of appeasement could Mr. Lippmann suggest?"

[39] Excerpts from article by Major George Fielding Eliot, published June 27, 1940.

"MAJOR ELIOT TAKES SHARP ISSUE WITH MOVES TO APPEASE JAPAN

"There are some voices in this country now raised in favor of an American 'understanding' with Japan, as a means for freeing our hands in the Atlantic. Why there should be any more virtue in a Japanese signature on a treaty today than there was on certain previous occasions of historic note it is difficult to understand.

"If we are compelled temporarily, or permanently, to abandon certain of our Pacific or Far Eastern interests by the necessity of concentrating our strength in the Atlantic, then we must do so. But let us be perfectly clear in our minds about what we are doing. Let us be sure that what we are abandoning is not worth more than what we can save by making any drastic changes in our dispositions.

"We must do the best we can, with a critical situation and inadequate military force, but let us not commit the crowning folly of again putting our faith in scraps of paper bearing totalitarian seals and promises."

[40] Excerpts from Oakland, California, *Tribune* editorial, June 19, 1940

"FIRMNESS IN THE FAR EAST

"What the United States' policy will be in the event of new Japanese aggression we do not know. But this much is patent on the basis of past experience: Any appeasement of Japan on the part of this country will defeat its ends by encouraging the Tokyo chauvinists, by giving the impression that we are weak, and by undermining our prestige with South American States who look to us for protection. It also is clear that we cannot stop Japan unless we are prepared for a protracted naval warfare in the Pacific and unless we use the great British naval base at Singapore. Whatever happens, we must be uncompromising in our opposition to the pilfering of Franco-British territory in the Far East."

[41] Excerpts from article by Barnet Nover, published June 28, 1940.

"CHINA FIGHTS ON"

"The spirit of appeasement is not dead; it has merely shifted its habitation. It is being urged that the United States come to terms with Japan in order that our fleet might be free for any eventualities that might occur on this side of the hemisphere. It may be that, faced by threats from both Asia and Europe, we shall have to abandon Asia and concentrate our force to resist incursions from the other side of the Atlantic.

"But let us be under no illusions as to what that would mean; it would be a capitulation to Japan and a capitulation which, in no sense, would add to our security.

"At the moment when she is still very vulnerable we would be permitting Japan to become invulnerable; at the moment when Japan is still at our mercy we would, by a policy of appeasement toward her, be placing ourselves at Japan's mercy. And at no time can we for a moment forget that the German threat from the East is paralleled by the Japanese threat from the West.

"As long as Great Britain fights on, the Nazi danger to us is limited; as long as China fights on, we have relatively little to fear from Japan. But China, like Great [42] Britain, is fighting our battles which is why out of selfishness no less than out of sentimental considerations, we must give whatever aid we can to both and desert neither.

"It is always the counsel of wisdom when facing grave emergencies to limit one's risks; but nothing is gained and much is lost when, in an attempt to limit risks, we stand a real chance of multiplying them."

[43] Excerpts from La Crosse, Wisconsin, *Tribune* editorial, June 22, 1940.

"NO APPEASEMENT HERE"

"Loss of prestige is one of Great Britain's chief liabilities at the present moment. With each concession, with each step backward, with each attempt to stave off danger, England lost face. In the case of the island empire, ill prepared as events proved, there was little else to do.

"But the United States is not now in a situation where it need proclaim to the whole world it is afraid. The nation is unprepared admittedly to fight in two oceans. But there is no doubt that if this country gears itself for defense—and it is gearing itself for defense—it can meet any challenge.

"It will not do to announce to the world that the last great democracy has lost its nerve. South America must have faith in the integrity of the United States and in this nation's ability to back up the Monroe doctrine. Japan will be less a menace if she fears America than if America fears her. Any agreement with Japan which revealed this nation's desire for protection would be tantamount to an invitation to attack.

"The Fascist nations put practical considerations before [44] ideals or principles. A treaty based on the fright of the United States would remain in effect only so long as Japan found it profitable.

"The world has been shown with terrible clarity the effects of such a peace as the Munich peace. Let not this nation make Great Britain's mistake."

[45] Excerpts from an article by Robert North in *Amerasia*, July 1940.

"AN AMERICAN-JAPANESE AXIS IS PROPOSED"

"Appeasement of Japan and withdrawal of the United States naval forces from the Pacific is urged by the Chicago *Tribune*, the New York *Daily News* and Walter Lippmann's column in the New York *Herald Tribune*. They propose negotiation of a new commercial agreement and diplomatic alignment with Japan.

"Be nice to Japan now, and we may well be able to double our fleet's effective strength by making friends with the Japanese Navy," says the *News*. "It seems to us the time has come for us to try to shut our back door, so to speak, before sending our best fighting men, guns, planes and ships out our front door to try to win another war for the Allies," it says editorially. So it recommends that we "insure ourselves against a two-front war if we can, by renewing our trade treaty with Japan and soft-pedaling the moral indignation over Japan's aggressions in China for a while."

"These proposals, if carried into effect, would leave the defense of our Pacific coast to the Japanese Navy, instead of our own. San Francisco, Seattle, Los Angeles, Portland would be protected by Japanese promises. So would Hawaii, the Philippines, and our trade and investment position in [46] the Far East, not to speak of Alaska and the Pacific approaches to Canada, Mexico and all points south in this hemisphere.

"These newspaper strategists give us for defense against Japanese aggression the Japanese Navy. On its decks will stand Japanese admirals, beaming friendship because civilians at home have signed another treaty.

"Why not go the whole way, gentlemen, and shut the front door on the Atlantic, also, by making a similar agreement with Hitler? Let bygones be bygones with him, as with Japan, and while we are at it treble our navy by adding the German and Italian fleets to ours along with the Japanese. Then with Hitler protecting us against Hitler on the East, and Japan protecting us against Japan on the West, we could get away from all this bother about national defense. We could use our new trade agreements to strengthen our new allies for our own protection. We could build them up economically, just as the Allies built up Hitler, and hope for the best."

"If Japan should emerge from this war with her industrial machine intact, she would no longer be a competitor merely in knick-knacks, toys, light bulbs and other small consumers' goods. She has shifted the center of gravity of her pro-

duction from light to heavy industry. The capacity of her heavy industrial plant has more than doubled since 1931".

[47] "Chinese resistance has not only prevented the proposed development of Chinese cotton, but has compelled importation of foreign growths for Chinese mills. But if, with the help of a new American trade agreement, Japan should succeed in subjugating China, or even in establishing a firm foothold in North China alone, the first condition for complete independence of American cotton will have been met. China is the third largest cotton producer.

"Success of the New Order means not only that Japan would be lost as our third largest customer by obtaining new sources of supply of the things she buys here; it means that she would be equipped for cut-throat competition in those very price markets, Latin America and Asia, which offer us the only opportunity for substantial expansion. At a time when the European market appears about to be closed to our goods, this would lead toward American export strangulation. The effects on our entire economic structure are incalculable."

[48] Full text of article by Walter Lippmann in New York Herald Tribune of June 6, 1940.

TOWARD A PEACE WITH JAPAN

Although the attention of the Americas is fixed upon Europe, they must never forget that the American continents are a great island set amidst the oceans of the world. On the west the ocean washes the coasts of Asia and of the island empires of the east.

The only Navy which the American hemisphere possesses is now in the western ocean. In that same ocean there is the Japanese navy. As between the United States and Japan, two nations which have never been at war, there has developed in recent years a growing opposition of policies, interests and diplomatic principle. Their relationship today is obviously unstable. The naval treaty has lapsed. The commercial treaty has been abrogated. In respect to China the two countries have taken positions which are in theory irreconcilable. In respect to the Netherlands Indies their public declarations promising respect for the status quo are ambiguous, and in the light of conceivable developments, exceedingly precarious.

To put the matter more plainly, the two countries confront each other across the vast expanse of the Pacific, each having taken a position where untoward circumstances or an uncalculated overt act might plunge both of them into a prolonged and exhausting struggle. In such a struggle [48a] neither Japan nor the United States would be serving its vital interests. Both nations would be sacrificing them. The Japanese, already suffering from the Chinese war, would by engaging and exhausting themselves still further make themselves vulnerable to the only great power, namely Russia, which can strike by land and by sea and by air at the very heart of the Japanese empire. The United States, by drifting into such a war, would be engaging the Navy for years to come in a confused and indecisive campaign on the other side of our world; yet at that very moment the security of the American continents may require the use of the whole Navy to guard those strategic points in the Atlantic Ocean which must be held if this hemisphere is to be defended.

It is now a kind of suicidal madness for the two nations to contemplate even the possibility of letting the existing tension and the existing conflicts of interest and principle develop into a war. For in such a war both would be sacrificing much greater principles than they were upholding and both would be jeopardizing fatally interests which are infinitely more important than those they were defending.

Some, perhaps, will feel that to express this candid view of Japanese-American relations is to display a deplorable weakness at a time when only strength and firmness are good currency in international affairs. I do not think it is weakness to make the plain truth the basis of national [48b] policy. The Japanese know their own strength and their own weaknesses and they know our strength and our weaknesses; and we know the same of them and of ourselves. Neither they nor we can afford to bluff. Neither we nor they can afford to provoke the other. This is the truth. And on the truth we shall both do well to found our policies.

Lest this opinion be ascribed to a sudden fear engendered by the critical state of Europe, I hope I may be pardoned for saying that many of us have held and expressed this view for a long time, ever since the outbreak of the European war was manifestly inevitable. For it has been clear to us that whatever our sympathies and interests in the Far East, a great European war for the domination of the Western World would affect directly and vitally the security and the independence of this hemisphere. We have held that, by comparison, our interests in the Far East would prove to be secondary, however important they might under more normal circumstances appear to be. We have, therefore, held that it was perilous and in the highest degree unstatesmanlike to let develop an irreconcilable conflict with Japan, to conceal from ourselves the immense gravity of such a conflict, to exacerbate the tension by threats and by declarations that are too absolute to be negotiable.

We have held that this provocative attitude was downright folly especially at a time when the country was doped and duped by a notion of "neutrality" in Europe which might compel it to stand by and risk the collapse of Allied sea power. We have argued that the policy of the majority of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate during the month of July a year ago was a classic example of how misguided men can imperil the security of a nation.

For in that fatal month the committee challenged Japan in the Pacific by supporting, and even by inciting to, the abrogation of the commercial treaty, and by brandishing the threat of an embargo; in the very same weeks when it was proposing to risk a war with Japan, the same committee was refusing to lift the embargo on the sale of arms to the Allies on the ground that what happened to them was no concern of ours. It was a most awful case of not letting your right hand know what your left hand is doing, an almost incredible case of being blindly provocative in one ocean and blindly supine in the other ocean. And unhappily the Administration, which knew better, acquiesced in this utterly unstatesmanlike policy of challenging Japan in Asia while we were forbidden to support the Allies in Europe.

The situation today is, of course, worse than it was then. But still the fundamental interests involved are the same. It is still true that Japan and the United States have nothing to gain and a very great deal to lose by going to war—or even by standing opposed as if they might be going to war. It is still true that our interests in the Far East are secondary to our interests in this hemisphere; because this is true, it follows that there is no conflict between Japan and the United States which is not reconcilable by diplomacy. We should, therefore, recognize this truth and should, I submit, enter immediately into friendly and conciliatory and candid negotiations with the Japanese for the avowed purpose of preserving the peace in the Pacific.

This is not a time for bluffing and this is not a time for indulging that false pride which causes men to cling to an untenable position. We know that we must defend our security and our very independence in this hemisphere and in the Atlantic Ocean. We know that Japan has a greater interest in Asia than we have. Let us recognize the fact. On the other hand, the Japanese position in the Far East is at least as difficult as is our position in the Western Hemisphere. Japan is at war with China. Japan has Soviet Russia for her nearest neighbor. Her commerce with this hemisphere is of critical importance to the standard of life of the Japanese people.

In these considerations there are the essential elements of a negotiation which might lead through a new commercial treaty to a political understanding based on the principle that the European war, which is also a European revolution, is not to be extended to the Pacific. We should aim high and aim far—at a new order of things in the Pacific in which, having adjusted our secondary conflicts, the two navies will cease to confront each other as potential antagonists and will be free to maintain order and stability in their respective spheres of influence.

I have no way of knowing whether the Japanese nation will respond to such a change of American policy. My belief is that they might, that they do not regard themselves as our enemies, that they respect the power we are capable of developing and that the best of the Japanese leaders and the mass of the

Japanese people desire peace with the United States. Even if this is not the fact, we shall never, I believe, regret having tried wholeheartedly to preserve the peace in half the world.

[49] Full text of New York Herald Tribune editorial, July 7, 1940.

"JAPAN'S APPEASEMENT"

It is rather amazing at this juncture, when the character of the totalitarian response to Mr. Chamberlain's appeasement policy is so familiar to every American, and seems so inevitable in retrospect, to note that there is some agitation in Washington and elsewhere for the appeasement of Japan. It is suggested that we make concessions to the Japanese point of view and negotiate a new commercial treaty with Japan, so that we can turn our backs on the Pacific and give all our attention to the menace from Europe. These suggestions, which have had Senator Vandenberg's support, must be borne of ignorance of the Japanese point of view, of the workings of the Japanese military mind and of Japan's record of bad faith.

It can be stated, without condition or reservation, that no price in terms of appeasement which this country could pay would buy Japanese good will or good behavior in the Pacific.

To get even an empty promise of security from a Japan whose policies are completely controlled by the uniformed expansionists, this country would have to recognize the justice of Japan's alienation of Manchuria and the martyrdom of China; recognize the legality of whatever position Japan can acquire in China through a campaign of indiscriminate slaughter and bestial savagery; recognize her police rights and special interests throughout eastern Asia, the adjacent waters [49a] and the East Indies; and agree to withdraw all armed forces from that part of the world and leave to Japan's discretion what access we should have to markets and sources of supply between Hawaii, Singapore and the Aleutian Islands. And what would the pledges bought with such concessions be worth in a crisis, if the fleet were withdrawn from the Pacific and if Nippon's militarists discovered that it was Japan's heaven-appointed destiny to expand in this direction? All pledges would then become as "in applicable" to Japan's mission in Hawaii, California, Alaska, or withersoever weak defenses invited her, as the nine-power treaty of 1922 is to continental expansion. Remember that among Asiatic totalitarians, as among Europe's Asiatic-minded despots, a leaning toward appeasement is irrefutable evidence of weakness and fear; and remember that, when the gods have delivered the weak into the hands of the strong, it is a breach of faith with divinity to keep faith with weakness.

Those who contend that we should buy security from Japan contend that the President, Mr. Hull and the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee have made a bungle of our relations with Japan. This is untrue. The powers of the United States government to check Japanese aggression and to resent flagrant breaches of faith have been limited, because of the nation's aversion to overseas entanglements and its fear that strong measures would bring reprisals, and reprisals, war. [49b] With such powers as it has had, however, it has put the only effective check on Japan's intense craving to profit by British, French and American preoccupation with the European situation.

The denunciation of the commercial treaty a year ago brought to an end the campaign of persecution against Occidentals in China, just when it was being extended to American citizens. Japanese persistence in that campaign would have meant war. The Administration's refusal to renew the treaty, since its expiration in January, and its retention of the right to impose disabilities upon Japanese trade which would have hamstrung the Japanese Army have kept the militarists in as placatory a mood as any influence could have short of the presence of an overwhelmingly superior army. The presence of the fleet in the Pacific has been the only sedative in the world that has restrained Japan's naval expansionists from adventures that would have brought the war into the Pacific.

[50] Full text of Chicago Daily Tribune editorial May 30, 1940.

"HOW TO DOUBLE THE FLEET IN A WEEK"

We are talking excitedly of armaments and congress is voting the money in billion dollar bills. War material is coming out of the mills on Capitol hill, but it is not coming out of the factories, and for a long, long time it will not be coming out of them. In the meantime we are neglecting to improve a situation affecting our Pacific frontier. The opportunity is there, and if this nation would make use of it it could double the power of its fleet and do more in a short time to increase the strength of its defenses than it can do in a year of production, even on a 24 hour day and a 7 day week.

The United States and Japan can come to a friendly understanding. There is no obstacle in the way except the determination of some Americans to dominate Japan's policy in China. Japan needs peace with the United States. Japanese statesmen may be looking at the future with as much uncertainty as prudent Americans. In a world rapidly changing from its old historical trends and whirling off its old historical foundations, Japan may feel quite as dubious as the United States. Many overtures have been made by Japan for an understanding which would deal with what is real in the relations of the two countries and avoid what is superficially conflicting.

[50a] The United States at this time cannot afford to conduct its foreign relations wholly on moral preconceptions. America may be able to aid China a great deal more effectively if it isn't quarreling with Japan than it can by keeping up a futile bombardment of threats and hard words which have done the Chinese no good and can do America a great deal of harm.

This country cannot afford to have an enemy in the Pacific. It is not necessary to have one there. Peaceable trade can be resumed and a peaceable understanding can be had. That understanding would rest upon material advantages which Japan would obtain from friendship with the United States and therefore would have the promise of an enduring understanding.

Japan need not be driven into the German-Italian camp. If events progress as they have been doing in Europe the British and French interests in China will be canceled out. Japan then will have won a major campaign. Its policy has been, in a way, a duplicate of our Monroe doctrine. Japan has objected to the entrenchment of powerful European nations off its coast, just as we would object to the same thing in relation to our national life.

Japan would be disposed to be more reasonable if Chinese ports and forts were not in European hands. China itself will be better satisfied to know that the foreigner [50b] is out. The Japanese are more willing now than ever to come to a settlement in China which will relieve them of a protracted and expensive war. That may not be possible at once, but an understanding between the United States and Japan might do more to conciliate the Chinese question than can be expected from the present bellicose attitude of the American government.

If we intend to keep our Pacific front bristling with threats the Japanese will look for their associations in other quarters and we know exactly where that will be. If the people in Washington who are rushing to arms in fear of a danger to the eastern front are sincere, if they mean to take precautions and provide against the future, they'll protect the western flank by making a friendly arrangement with the power which controls the far east. They won't so manage American affairs that trouble in the Atlantic will be accompanied by trouble in the Pacific. While they are passing a billion dollar appropriation for the American navy they won't continue to make it necessary to keep the battle fleet on its Honolulu base.

By accepting the Japanese overtures they can double the strength of the fleet immediately. The best defense policy of the United States could be written within a few weeks in a renewed trade treaty with the Japanese. That peaceable treaty would immediately enable the United States to use its [50c] fleet in the Atlantic if that's where it is needed. It would not be tied as now to the Pacific. In effect the strength of the fleet would be doubled by cutting half its problem away.